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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPROACHES TO MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE REFORM

ELEANOR D. KINNEY*

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has just witnessed its third crisis in the availability and
affordability of medical liability insurance in thirty years.1 Many physicians
and other providers delivered health-care services with no liability insurance or
stopped providing services altogether.2 Physicians and other health-care
providers, as well as medical liability insurers, are calling for reforms.3 Before
Congress is the Bush Administration’s proposal advanced as a cornerstone of
the Administration’s health policy, to modify state tort law by federal law.4
* A.B., Duke University, 1969; J.D., Duke University, 1973; M.P.H., University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1979. Hall Render Professor of Law and Co-Director, The William S.
and Christine S. Hall Center for Law and Health, Indiana University School of Law Indianapolis.
I would like to thank my research assistants Scott Wooldridge, Jennifer Wallander, and Carolyn
Grace Key for their work in this article.
1. See William M. Sage, The Forgotten Third: Liability Insurance and The Medical
Malpractice Crisis, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 10. See generally Kenneth E. Thorpe, The
Medical Malpractice ‘Crisis’: Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH
AFF., Jan. 21, 2004, at W4-20, available at http://www.healthaffairs.org.
2. See, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, Rise in Insurance Forces Hospitals to Shutter Wards, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, § 1, at 1; Susan Warner, Practicing Without a Net, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
2002, § 14NJ, at 1.
3. American Medical Association, Medical Liability Reform, available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/9255.html (“AMA has designated medical liability reform as its
number one priority.”); American Hospital Association, Health Care Liability Reform, available
at http://www.hospitalconnect.com/aha/key_issues/hpl/; MARKET CONDITIONS WORKING
GROUP, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS COMM’RS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A STUDY OF
MARKET CONDITIONS (Sept. 9, 2003) (Draft Report presented to the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners), available at http://www.wsma.org/NAIC_medmal_study.pdf (last
visited Sept. 1, 2004); see also Harming Patient Access to Care: The Impact of Excessive
Litigation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002).
4. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2004, H.R.
4280, 108th Cong. (2004); Pregnancy and Trauma Care Access Protection Act of 2004, S. 2207,
108th Cong. (2004); Healthy Mothers and Healthy Babies Access to Care Act of 2003, S. 2061,
108th Cong. (2004); Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of
2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003); Patients First Act of 2003, S. 11, 108th Cong. (2003).
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This proposal calls for the imposition of a cap on non-economic damages as
well as other measures aimed at reducing the frequency and severity of
medical malpractice claims. States are adopting similar reforms as well.5
The latter half of the Twentieth Century witnessed an explosive expansion
in tort liability generally.6 One consequence of this explosion in tort law has
been a call for the reform of the state common law tort system and curtailment
of expanding tort liability.7 Of note, a substantial body of analysis, much of it
empirical, defends the performance of the common law tort system in handling
tort claims during this period.8 Like other areas of tort law, liability for
medical malpractice expanded with changes in rules governing the standard of
care and a greater willingness of medical specialists to testify in medical
malpractice cases.9 Subsequently, there have been three crises in the
availability and affordability of medical liability insurance that have made
medical liability insurance unduly expensive and often unavailable, which in

5. See Am. Med. Ass’n, Medical Liability Reform—NOW!: A Compendium of Facts
Supporting Medical Liability Reform and Debunking Arguments Against Reform 23–35 (2004),
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/450/mlrnowjune112004.pdf; Health
Policy Studies Div., Nat’l Governors Ass’n, Issue Brief: Addressing the Medical Malpractice
Insurance Crisis (Dec. 5, 2002), available at http://www.nga.org/center/divisions/
1,1188,C_ISSUE_BRIEF^D_4703,00.html.
6. See generally PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1988); TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION,
AND CONSUMER WELFARE (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991); Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman,
Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation
for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75 (1993).
7. See Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice
Liability Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417
(2004); Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 YALE J.
ON REG. 435 (1995); STEPHEN J. CARROLL & NICHOLAS PACE, ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF
TORT REFORMS (1987); see generally American Tort Reform Association, available at
http://www.atra.org;
American
Tort
Reform
Foundation,
available
at
http://www.atrafoundation.org; Doctors for Medical Liability Reform, available at
http://www.protectpatientsnow.org.
8. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis?
New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315 (1999); Deborah R. Hensler, The Real World of
Tort Litigation, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 155 (Austin Sarat et al. eds.,
1998); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996);
Deborah R. Hensler, Reading the Tort Litigation Tea Leaves: What’s Going on in the Civil
Liability System?, JUST. SYS. J., Spring 1993, at 139; Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1147 (1992); Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986).
9. See Matt Clark et al., Malpractice: MD’s Revolt, NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 58, 65; J.
S. Boyden, Jr., Editorial: On the Independence of Expert Witnesses, J. LEGAL MED., July/August
1976, at 3.
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turn has disrupted the ability of physicians and other providers to deliver
medical care.10
The major critique of the state common law tort system with respect to
malpractice is that the processes of imposing liability for medical injury and
compensating medical injury are inefficient and, more important, result in
inconsistent and irrational outcomes.11 Specifically, it is argued that jury
decisions and awards in malpractice cases are inconsistent and irrational and
often based on unsound science,12 a major critique of tort litigation generally. 13
Further, many meritorious claims are neither filed nor compensated.14 To the
extent that such eventualities make it more difficult for medical liability
insurers to predict the outcome of claims, they infuse a degree of uncertainty
into underwriting that necessarily makes liability insurance less affordable or
even available.15

10. Thorpe, supra note 1, at W4-20.
11. See Symposium, Medical Malpractice: External Influences and Control, 60 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1997); Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Lessons for Reform, 54 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1991); Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Can the Private Sector Find
Relief?, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1986).
12. See, e.g., Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research
on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622 (2001); Symposium: The American
Civil Jury: Illusion and Reality, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 197 (1998); Christopher E. Smith, Imagery,
Politics, and Jury Reform, 28 AKRON L. REV. 77 (1994); Jody Weisberg Menon, Adversarial
Medical and Scientific Testimony and Lay Jurors: A Proposal for Medical Malpractice Reform,
21 AM. J.L. & MED. 281 (1995).
13. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN
THE LAW (1999); Peter W. Huber, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURT ROOM
(1993); Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 1637 (1993); Joelle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating
the Oceans that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033
(2001); A. Dan Tarlock, Who Owns Science?, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 135 (2002); David L.
Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 555 (1995); Jeff L.
Lewin, Calabresi’s Revenge? Junk Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183
(1992); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts, Causation, and Scientific Evidence After Daubert,
55 U. PITT. L. REV. 889 (1994); Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing “Junk Science”, 1998
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (1998); Vicki Christian, Comment, Admissibility of Scientific Expert
Testimony: Is Bad Science Making Law?, 18 N. KY. L. REV. 21 (1990).
14. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the
Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1963 (1996). See
also PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993).
15. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-03-702, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 15–16
(2003); MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE REPORT: A STUDY OF MARKET CONDITIONS, supra
note 3; see generally FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1991); Ralph
A. Winter, Perspective on the Insurance Crisis: The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of
Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 455 (1988).
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As a result of these crises, medical malpractice has become yet another
area of state tort law that has been attacked as inadequate to meet the twin
ostensible aims of tort: compensation of tort victims and punishment of
tortfeasors.16 Most early reforms of malpractice focused on controlling claim
frequency or severity through damage caps and other measures.17 Since the
1970s, particularly in academic circles, there has been considerable interest in
medical malpractice reform and a plethora of proposals for malpractice reform
that went beyond reducing frequency and severity of malpractice claims.18
Such reforms included various no-fault compensation schemes,19 alternative
dispute resolution methods for adjudicating claims,20 and enterprise liability
for health plans.21 These later proposals explicitly try to improve the
malpractice adjudication or compensation system from the perspective of
claimants and to address negligent medical practice more directly.
Yet, despite the hue and cry over medical malpractice and the widespread
concern that medical malpractice law has failed, there has been little
exploration of administrative approaches to provide systems of adjudication
and compensation that are more efficient and fair to address the crisis.
Following the crisis of the mid-1980s, the American Medical Association and
the Professional Insurers of America Association (PIAA) floated proposals for
administrative, fault-based systems at the state level.22 However, these
16. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 46–52
(5th ed. 1984).
17. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a
Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 499, 522–27, (1989); PATRICIA M. DANZON,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 158–173 (1985).
18. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Malpractice Reform in the 1990s: Past Disappointments, Future
Success?, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 99 (1995).
19. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory
and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53 (1998); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Administrative
Performance of “No-Fault” Compensation for Medical Injury, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71
(1997); Barbara A. Brill, Comment, An Experiment in Patient Injury Compensation: Is Utah the
Place?, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 987 (1996). See also Jeffrey O’Connell & James F. Neale, HMO’s,
Cost Containment, and Early Offers: New Malpractice Threats and a Proposed Reform, 14 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 287, 295–96 (1998).
20. ELEANOR D. KINNEY, PROTECTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS (2002);
Eleanor D. Kinney, Tapping and Resolving Consumer Concerns About Health Care, 26 AM. J.L.
& MED. 335, 348–68 (2000); Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice
Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203 (1996); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey Rice, Jury-Determined
Settlements and Summary Jury Trials: Observations About Alternative Dispute Resolution in an
Adversary Culture, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89 (1991).
21. See William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care
System, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (1997); Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler,
Enterprise Medical Liability and the Choice of the Responsible Enterprise, 20 AM. J.L. & MED.
29 (1994).
22. COMM. TO STUDY ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT SYS., PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N
OF AM., A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF
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proposals received little attention when they were made and subsequently. It is
quite curious that reformers now are not looking to administrative law as they
have in the past when tort law has failed. Administrative law has had much to
offer in the past in curing deficiencies in tort law.23 It has much to offer today.
This article explores the potential contributions of administrative law to the
reform of the adjudication and compensation of medical malpractice claims.
II. THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS
The conventional medical malpractice claim, based on negligence,
contains four elements.24 First is the duty on the part of the defendant not to
expose the plaintiff to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury. Second is the
breach of that duty by the defendant’s violation of the applicable standard of
care. Third, the defendant’s breach of the duty must be the cause of the
plaintiff’s injury. Finally, the plaintiff must have suffered actual damage to a
legally protected interest. To establish a prima facia case of negligence, the
plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant had a duty not to expose the
plaintiff to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury, that the defendant breached
that duty as defined by the applicable standard of care, that the breach caused
the damage, and that there was actual damage.
A.

Problems with Proving Elements of the Prima Facia Case in Medical
Malpractice

According to Restatement (Third) of Torts, Tentative Draft, a person is
negligent when that “person does not exercise reasonable care under all the
circumstances.”25 Making this determination is difficult particularly because
the application of this rule is contextual. It is also the quintessential example
of a mixed question of law and fact, in which both the court and jury have
different roles to play in determining the issue and their roles overlap in many
respects.26 The most important factual issue in this mixed question of law and
fact is the tortfeasor’s foreseeability of the injury as well as whether the
tortfeasor breached the standard of care. The most important question of law is
what is the applicable standard of care?

RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY CLAIMS (1989); Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based
Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365
(1989).
23. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1061–62 (8th ed. 2004). See also KEETON ET AL., supra
note 16, § 30, at 164; KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 70–79
(1997).
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
26. KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 37, at 235.
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Foreseeability of Injury

The tort of negligence has always wrestled with how to address the issue
foreseeability of the risk of injury. In most cases where the relationship
between the tortfeasor and victim is fairly common—such as a treating
physician and patient—existence of a duty to foresee injury is fairly
straightforward. The analysis then proceeds to whether the tortfeasor breached
the duty of care—whether he acted as a reasonable person would have in like
or similar circumstances.
Duty itself becomes an issue when the relationship between the tortfeasor
and victim is more unusual and attenuated, raising the question of whether the
tortfeasor could have foreseen the injury as a matter of law, an issue that the
judge would decide in a negligence case. Specific issues include: 1) whether
an individual has a duty to an injured party if the risk of injury was not really
foreseeable but occurred, and 2) what is the standard for foreseeability
particularly when the risk of injury was small and/or the actual injury is
unusual. Another related question is whether, as a matter of fact, an injury can
be considered “caused” by another’s conduct if the injury was unusual or
occurred in an attenuated and remote manner even though there was a physical
chain of connecting events following the defendant’s conduct that gave rise to
the injury.
Causation has been a point of debate since the early twentieth century, in
particular since Judge Cardozo’s landmark decision in Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co.,27 which imposed liability on a defendant railroad for an injury
caused in an unusual way.28 There was fierce debate over this issue during the
drafting the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the 1950s and 1960s29 Even
today, as the American Law Institute prepares the Restatement (Third) of
Torts,30 there has been vigorous debate as to whether foreseeability in
negligence law is a question of duty, which is a matter of law; a question of

27. 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See also William Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1953); ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 78–80 (1963).
28. See, e.g., Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401
(1961) [hereinafter Foreseeability]; Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law,
60 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1962) [hereinafter The Causal Relation Issue]; Heidi M. Hurd and
Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 333 (2002); John C. P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence
Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001); Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush:
Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071
(2001); ABRAHAM, supra note 24, at 118–29.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291–293 (1965). See, e.g., Foreseeability, supra
note 28; The Causal Relation Issue, supra note 28; Prosser, supra note 27; KEETON ET AL., supra
note 16.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
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breach, which is a mixed question of law and fact; or a question of proximate
cause, which is a question of fact. 31
Another dimension of foreseeability is the degree to which lay perceptions
of foreseeability are, on one hand, scientific fact, or culturally determined
and/or socially constructed, on the other hand. At first glance, foreseeability
with respect to each element of the negligence case appears to be a
straightforward question. The standard of care, in malpractice cases, is a
matter of medical opinion and scientific fact, while the issue of foreseeability
is based on common and shared human experience. Furthermore, the standard
of care asks, “what would other similarly trained physicians do in similar
circumstances,” and its establishment is based on expert testimony. Similarly,
determinations of causation are based either on lay perceptions of
foreseeability or causation informed, where necessary, by expert opinion.
Therein lies the basis for the conclusion that foreseeability is culturally
determined and even socially constructed. Proof of foreseeability of the risk,
factors in the causation of the risk to occur, or breach of the standard of care
are not based completely on scientific fact, to the extent that scientific facts
inform the issues. Intuitive and other considerations are always implicated
whether the judge or jury is making the determination. This characteristic of
the proof of the elements of negligence as culturally determined and/or socially
constructed effectively gives the judge and jury, as law interpreters and factfinders, much latitude in their evaluation and acceptance of scientific evidence
and other culturally or socially important factors. This phenomenon may
explain the debate over whether juries in medical malpractice and other tort
cases are rational when assessing science and/or awarding damages.32
31. See, e.g., James R. Adams, From Babel to Reason: An Examination of the Duty Issue, 31
MCGEORGE L. REV. 25 (1999); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law
of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998).
32. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability And Damages:
Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301 (1998);
Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243
(1997); David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damage Assessments: A
Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and
Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109 (1995); Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and
Suffering: A Method For Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages For Nonmonetary Injuries, 83
CAL. L. REV. 773 (1995); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical
Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 997 (1990). But see,
e.g., Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of
Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265 (1999); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American
Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849 (1998); Neil Vidmar, Pap and
Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us About Jury Behavior and the Tort
System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205 (1994); Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep
Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE
L.J. 217 (1993). See also Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil
Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233 (1996).
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The Standard of Care

The determination of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases, in
most jurisdictions,33 is what a reasonable physician in the same specialty
would do in like or similar circumstances.34 In medical malpractices cases, the
determination of this standard is ceded to the medical profession. As a
practical matter, the standard is set in individual malpractice cases through
expert testimony of what one or more experts believe to be the relevant
standard of care.35 That expert is not required to substantiate his or her opinion
of the standard of care with references to outside sources such as medical
textbooks by acknowledged experts or medical practice guidelines and other
medical standards of care by medical specialty societies, voluntary health
organizations, or other medical professional groups.
Currently, the medical standard of care in a medical malpractice case is
really a matter of public policy on science, even though in malpractice cases,
due to the role of the jury and reliance on expert witnesses, its establishment is
based on culturally determined perceptions or social constructs. As a matter of
science policy, the standard of medical care in a community or a specialty
really could and should be established by reference to more valid and
verifiable expert authority in medical malpractice litigation. Reliance on the
oral testimony of individual physicians is really an inefficient and unreliable
way of getting information about the standard of care and its application to the
fact-finders.
Today, with the evolution of evidence-based medicine,36 the standard of
care is becoming a matter of a consensus of medical science based on

33. See David M. Epstein, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Physician’s Admission of
Negligence as Establishing Standard of Care and Breach of that Standard, 42 A.L.R.5TH 1
(1996); James O. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status of “Locality Rule” in Malpractice
Action Against Physician Who is Not a Specialist, 99 A.L.R.3D 1133 (1980); James Duff, Jr.,
Annotation, Malpractice Testimony: Competency of Physician or Surgeon from One Locality to
Testify, in Malpractice Case, as to Standard of Care Required of Defendant Practicing in Another
Locality, 37 A.L.R.3D 420 (1971).
34. See Lori Rinella, Comment, The Use of Medical Practice Guidelines in Medical
Malpractice Litigation—Should Practice Guidelines Define the Standard of Care?, 64 UMKC L.
REV. 337, 346 (1995); John C. Drapp III, Comment, The National Standard of Care in Medical
Malpractice Actions: Does Small Area Analysis Make It Another Legal Fiction?, 6 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 95, 97 (2003); Sam A. McConkey IV, Comment, Simplifying the Law in Medical
Malpractice: The Use of Practice Guidelines as the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 491, 496 (1995).
35. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Empirical Evidence and Malpractice Litigation, 37 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 757, 758 (2002).
36. See, e.g., DAVID L. KATZ, CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY & EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE:
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CLINICAL REASONING & RESEARCH (2001); DAVID L. SACKETT
ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE AND TEACH EBM (2d ed. 2000);
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empirical evidence. Specifically, since the 1980s, three developments have
driven the expanded and increasingly sophisticated
use of medical standards of care in the delivery of health-care services in the
United States today: (1) the standard-setting movement of the 1980s, with
leadership from medical specialties and pressure from third-party payers; (2)
the rise of managed care in the late 1990s, with health plans and providers
delivering care in integrated delivery systems with computerized patient
records systems; and (3) advances in the theory and science of defining,
measuring, and improving the quality of medical care.37

The medical profession has clearly embraced medical practical guidelines,
based on empirically derived medical evidence and developed in transparent
and inclusive processes to be a conclusive consensus of experts on what is the
standard of care from a medical perspective in treating a particular medical
condition. Today there are thousands of medical standards of care used in
nearly all clinical settings to guide medical practice and to asses the quality of
care. Clearly, from the perspective of the medical profession the standard of
care is a carefully considered matter of scientific fact supported by empirical
evidence.
Yet, in tort litigation, the standard of care is much more haphazardly
determined. In an individual case, it can be set by reference to applicable
standards of care as though the unsubstantiated opinion of one practitioner with
minimal credentials. There is vocal criticism that medical experts are not
acknowledged or established as experts in their field and that their testimony
does not comport with the best science available.38 While the Supreme Court
has attempted to improve judicial gatekeeping on the admissibility of expert
testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence,39 apparently these decisions
have not had a major impact on the use of expert testimony in medical
malpractice cases.40 In sum, it is clear that the current methodology for
determining the standard of care and its breach in medical malpractice lawsuits
has not kept up with the state of the art in modern medicine.

DANIEL J. FRIEDLAND ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: A FRAMEWORK FOR CLINICAL
PRACTICE (1998).
37. Eleanor D. Kinney, The Brave New World of Medical Standards of Care, 29 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 323 (2001).
38. See Special Issue: Evidence: Its Meanings in Health Care and in Law, 26 J. HEALTH
POL., POL’Y & L. 191 (2001).
39. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
40. See Daniel W. Shuman, Expertise in Law, Medicine, and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 267 (2001).
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The Measure of Damages

The determination of damages in medical malpractice cases is likewise
established primarily through expert testimony of economists.41 However,
critics argue that damage awards are inconsistent in similar cases without
justification or rationale especially when juries are making determinations.42
Of note, empirical information suggests that jury damage awards are not as
erratic as critiques suggest and are generally consistent with other legal
decision makers.43 However, medical science can also be brought to bear in
assessing the severity and duration of injury and can be harnessed to determine
the appropriate level of compensation for particular injuries of various
severities and durations in a democratic manner.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPROACHES TO THE RESOLUTION OF TORT
CLAIMS
For the determination and proof of each element of the tort of medical
malpractice, administrative law offers helpful approaches for reform. Outlined
below are administrative law approaches to reform that might well be applied
to the adjudication of the elements of the prima facia case and also the
defenses in a medical malpractice claim.
A.

Theoretical Issues

Important theoretical issues arise when administrative law approaches are
used to resolve any public policy issue. Specifically, under administrative law
theory, the state should establish public adjudication systems only for
regulatory or benefactory programs that benefit the public generally. The
legislature should not intervene where a problem involves individuals in their
private affairs. State courts wrestled with this distinction in the early
Twentieth Century when they sought to improve the adjudication and
compensation of injuries on the job with administrative workers compensation
schemes.44 In many states, there were challenges to these schemes on grounds
that they inappropriately replaced common law tort remedies.45
41. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 188–
89 (5th ed. 1984).
42. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
43. See Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison
of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 770 (1999); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J.
Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of
Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 896 (1993).
44. ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION § 42.23, at 7–651 (1987).
45. See Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (1911) (invalidating New York State’s
original workers’ compensation statute). But see N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188
(1917) (upholding the amended New York workers’ compensation statute). See also Helfrick v.
Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 176 N.E. 141 (1931).
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In its 1932 decision, Crowell v. Benson,46 the United States Supreme Court
recognized this public-private distinction with respect to a federally sponsored
workers’ compensation program with adjudication of claims by the agency. In
concluding that adjudications could proceed before the administrative agency
rather than an Article III court, the Court decided on grounds that judicial
review was available to review the administrative decisions. Since Crowell v.
Benson, the Supreme Court has become much more comfortable in drawing
the line of public law to include threats to health and safety of individuals and
the population.47
Indeed, public administrative law has been an important source of reform
concepts when tort law has failed. When automobile accidents and insurance
therefore became problematic in the 1950s and 1960s, reformers looked to
statutory no-fault compensation plans to adjudicate and compensate auto
accident claims.48 As part of the debate over statutory compensation schemes
for auto accidents, Guido Calabresi wrote his famous critique of the tort system
as an inefficient means for minimizing the cost of accidents—one of the most
persistent condemnations of the common law tort system even today.49 More
recently, in so-called mass tort litigation, courts have used administrative law
approaches to adjudicate claims for injury and damage. For example, in
asbestos litigation, a special master of the federal district court, functioning
much like an administrative agency, adjudicates and compensates individual
damage claims.50
In the 1960s, administrative law took on a greater role in regulating risks to
heath and safety. In the 1960s and 1970s, in response to public concerns about
environmental pollutions and industrial technology, Congress enacted
46. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and
Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815 (1989); John Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson:
Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of “Constitutional Fact,” 80 U.
PA. L. REV. 1055 (1932); Judicial Review of Administrative Findings—Crowell v. Benson, 41
YALE L.J. 1037 (1932).
47. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C.
State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985);
Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
48. See ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965); WALTER J. BLUM &
HARRY KALVEN, JR., PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM: AUTO
COMPENSATION PLANS (1965).
49. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
50. See Steven Kazan, Asbestos Litigation & Tort Law: Trends, Ethics, &
Solutions: Legislative Attempts to Address Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 227 (2003);
Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721 (2002);
STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM
REPORT (2002), available at http://www.rand.org/publications; see also Asbestos Litigation
Crisis: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003).
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numerous statutes to regulate risk to health and safety from a wide variety of
sources and activities in the environment and the workplace.51 The regulatory
programs under these statutes raised a host of complex scientific issues the
accurate resolution of which was crucial for effective and publicly accepted
regulation. By the 1970s, making decisions about scientific issues in a
democratic manner was a central mission of administrative law.52
As administrative law has matured, it has moved beyond concerns about
whether a matter is sufficiently public to be handled by public law and
therefore administrative agencies—particularly when matters of human health
and safety are involved. Mature administrative law is now much more
concerned with crafting effective procedures for policy-making and dispute
resolution. For example, it is concerned with assuring that scientific and
technical information used to solve public law problems, such as threats to
human health and safety, are accurate and reconciled in a way that results in
sound and fair policies and decisions.
One of the greatest contributions of administrative law is the recognition
that policy-making processes, rather than adjudication, are best for determining
many factual issues based on physical or social sciences. Often, facts involving
51. See, e.g., Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, §§ 1–5, 83
Stat. 275, 275–278 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1531); National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321); Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 7401); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, § 2(b), 86 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136); Noise
Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
4901); Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-240, §§ 1–3, 86 Stat. 47
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93523, 88 Stat. 1660 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201); Toxic Substances Control Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2601); Federal Mine
Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.C. § 801); Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91
Stat. 1393 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, Pub. L. No. 95-190 § 326(b), 91 Stat. 1404, 1405 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251); National Ocean Pollution
Research and Development and Monitoring Planning Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-273, 92 Stat.
228 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1701); Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1221); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 18 (Table 1.2) (2002).
52. See Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA.
L. REV. 1403 (1983); David L. Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 817 (1977); Arthur Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 63
AM. SCIENTIST 505 (1975).
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physical or social science do not vary in the cases of individual regulated
parties. Further adjudicative proceedings are established through expert
testimony. Variations in the knowledge and experience of experts tend to
result in variations in the determination of scientific facts that may not be
accurate.
Further, administrative law theory recognizes that such facts can be
determined in a systematic manner marshaling relevant empirical information
and are not adduced solely by the descriptive observation of individual factfinders or expert witnesses. An example of this phenomenon, which is
particularly apt in the case of tort, is the use of scientific methods in risk
analysis by regulatory agencies.53 These concepts and how they could be used
to improve medical malpractice adjudication and compensation are explained
in detail below.
B.

The Concept of “Legislative Facts” and its Application to Malpractice

The late Professor Kenneth Culp Davis articulated the concept of
“legislative facts” in the 1940s.54 According to Professor Davis, “[l]egislative
facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are the general facts
which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion.” 55
Legislative facts are distinguished from “adjudicative facts,” which Professor
Davis describes as “[f]acts pertaining to the parties and their businesses and
activities.”56
Policy-making processes, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking under §
553 of the Federal Administrative Procedures Act57 are most appropriate for
determining legislative facts. These processes enable decision makers to
marshal all relevant scientific information in its original format, e.g., published
articles, peer-reviewed empirical research, governmental studies and reports, as
well as commentary of acknowledged experts. In addition, interested parties
can put information before the decision maker.
Furthermore, how scientific facts should be used in applying legal
standards are, in the words of Professor Lon Fuller, “polycentric” issues,
involving multiple considerations many of which are really policy or even
moral judgments.58 Adjudication is not a good decision-making process for
determining these kinds of polycentric issues, according to Professor Fuller.
Adjudication does not flush out all the important considerations needed to
53. See infra text accompanying notes 104–117.
54. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to the Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942).
55. 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.3, at 413 (2d ed. 1979).
56. Id.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
58. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–404
(1978).
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make sound determinations of legislative fact.
One reason for this
phenomenon is that the placement of facts before the decision maker is
generally in the control of the parties and not the decision makers. Further, the
information must generally be relevant to the dispute at issue and thus
information that addresses broader policy concerns may not get before the
decision maker.
In sum, legislative facts ideally should not be established in an adjudicative
proceeding that does not permit the consideration of all the factors that are
considered in determining questions of law, policy, and discretion. Rather,
legislative facts should be developed in a legislative-type process such as a
legislative hearing in which the conveners can marshal all relevant information
in a systematic fashion from all interested and affected parties.
1.

Use of Legislative Facts in Adjudication

This important distinction in the nature of factual determinations and the
appropriate process for making these determinations has become welldeveloped in administrative law. Administrative law theory prefers informal
policy-making processes for determining legislative facts.59 Indeed, current
administrative law theory eschews using trial-type proceedings in rulemaking
because it contributes little to the accurate determination of legislative facts.60
Furthermore, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,61 the United States Supreme Court made it
very clear that an agency could determine an important scientific fact, i.e., the
environmental risks posed by nuclear waste, in an informal rulemaking
proceeding and then subsequently use that fact in making a decision in an
adjudicative proceeding.
Currently, many agencies routinely determine legislative factual issues in
policy-making processes independently of the adjudication in which they may
be raised.62 Further, when issues involving legislative facts arise in
adjudicative hearings, the administrative law doctrine of “official notice” is
available to permit admission of legislative facts into evidence without
preparing a foundation with an expert witness.63

59. See 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.4, at 23 (2d ed.
1980).
60. See Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability (Recommendation
No. 72–5), 38 Fed. Reg. 19,782, 19,782 (July 23, 1973). See also United States v. Fla. E. Coast
Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
61. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit,
and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345 (1978).
62. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to
the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1072–77 (1989).
63. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.4.8, at 229–
34 (2d ed. 2001).
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A great example of how an agency recently used a policy-making process
to establish legislative facts that were relevant in its adjudicative proceedings is
the promulgation of its medical-vocational guidelines used in determining
disability for Social Security programs as a legislative rule by the Social
Security Administration (SSA).64 SSA promulgated these regulations in the
1980s in order to bring more consistency to the determination of qualification
for disability benefits at a time when demand for benefits was growing
dramatically and SSA had great concerns about inequities resulting from
inconsistent testimony of vocational experts about the existence of jobs in the
national economy.65 The Social Security Act provides that a claimant,
not only [be] unable to do his previous work but [must be unable], considering
his age, education, and work experience, [to] engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of
whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a
specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied
for work.66

The medical-vocational guidelines are basically decision trees to be
followed in determining whether jobs exist in the national economy for
individuals with specific characteristics with respect to degree of impairment,
age, education, and work experience.67 The guidelines commence with the
recognition that there are certain impairments that are so severe that no one
with the impairment could pursue any gainful work. 68 If the claimant has such
an impairment, disability is determined with no further adjudication.
The guidelines then delineate the elements of the statutory elements that
are relevant in determining whether a claimant is qualified for benefits. These
elements include whether the claimant retains the ability to perform either his
former work or some less demanding employment, and if not, whether the
claimant retains the capacity to pursue less demanding work elsewhere.69 To
address this second element, the regulation requires an assessment of the
claimant’s present job qualifications according to the following relevant
64. Rules for Adjudicating Disability Claims in Which Vocational Factors Must be
Considered, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349 (Nov. 18, 1978) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P (2004)).
65. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409 (1997).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2000). The Social Security Act authorizes two disability
programs: the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434
(2000), id. at § 423 (schedule of benefits), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, id.
at § 404. The federal government contracts with states to determine disability under both
programs. Id. at § 423. The definitions of disability for the SSI program are those used for the
SSDI program. Id. at § 416.
67. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P.
68. See id. at § 404.1520(d) (referring to impairments listed at pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1).
69. See id. at § 404.1520(e)–(f).
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factors: physical ability, age, education, and work experience.70 Then a
determination occurs of whether jobs exist in the national economy that a
person with the claimant’s qualifications could perform.71 The decision maker
matches the claimant’s specific characteristics regarding degree of impairment,
age, education and work experience, all matters of adjudicative fact, with the
factors in the guidelines. The decision maker then follows the decision trees to
determine whether a suitable job in the national economy, a matter of
legislative fact, exists for the claimant.72 These guidelines eliminate the need
to call vocational experts to establish the existence of suitable jobs in the
national economy.
The medical-vocational guidelines have withstood legal challenge,73 as
well as widespread criticism.74 In Sullivan v. Zebley, the United States
Supreme Court delineated the dimensions of their use but did not invalidate the
guidelines.75 These guidelines are now an accepted part of Social Security
disability determinations. To gain this acceptance, they have had to function
relatively effectively and fairly. One reason for their success may be the
specificity in addressing most conceivable variations that claimants exhibit
with respect to physical ability, age, education and work experience. The
experience with these guidelines has much to offer malpractice litigation,
particularly with respect to defining and applying the applicable standard of
care and also in determining damages.
2.

Using Legislative Facts to Establish the Standard of Care

The concept of legislative fact can make an important contribution to the
establishment of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases. As
discussed above,76 the standard of care for diagnosis and treatment of a disease
or injury is really a quintessential matter of legislative fact. Also as discussed
above,77 the establishment of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases
involves the testimony of often only one physician who testifies, based on

70. Id. at § 404.1520(g).
71. Id. at §§ 404.1520(f), .1566 to .1569.
72. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 (2004).
73. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987).
74. See generally Mark S. Smith, Heckler v. Campbell and the Grid: Are Disability
Claimants Entitled to Examples of Suitable Jobs?, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 501 (1984); John J.
Capowski, Accuracy and Consistency in Categorical Decision-Making: A Study of Social
Security’s Medical-Vocational Guidelines—Two Birds with One Stone or Pigeon-Holing
Claimants?, 42 MD. L. REV. 329 (1983).
75. 493 U.S. 521 (1990). See Richard P. Weishaupt & Robert E. Rains, Sullivan v. Zebley:
New Disability Standards for Indigent Children to Obtain Government Benefits, 35 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 539 (1991).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 54–75.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 33–40.
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anecdotal experience, as to what is the applicable standard of care in a given
case.
Recognition that standard-setting is a matter of legislative fact permits
greater policing and possibly even elimination of expert testimony to establish
the standard of care—thus addressing a persistent complaint about current
malpractice litigation.78 The standard of care for the diagnosis and treatment
of disease and injury is a legislative fact in that it can be established without
reference to particular individuals. This is not to say that there is not variation
in the course of disease or injury in specific individuals, but again, these
variations generally depend on factors particular to classes of human beings
and not on factors that, as a rule, exist in only one individual. In the latter case,
individual variation would be an adjudicative fact, but to the extent that
specific variations are predictable across human beings, their determination
would be a matter of legislative fact. If the variation were not unique to the
claimant, how the physician should have addressed the variation could be
included in a medical practice guideline and determined as a legislative fact.
Medical practice guidelines are “systematically developed statements of
recommendation for patient management to assist practitioner and patient
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances.”79
Another definition is “[s]tandardized specifications for care developed by a
formal process that incorporates the best scientific evidence of effectiveness
with expert opinion.”80 They are among an array of medical standards of care
used for various purposes in the delivery of health care.81 Since their
emergence on a widespread basis in the 1980s, medical practice guidelines
have become increasingly widespread and sophisticated. The guidelines have
moved from statements of procedures that constitute good quality care to
detailed decision trees that guide steps in care depending on patient-specific
variables.82 Now medical practice guidelines, medical standards of care and
the theoretical foundation of evidence-based medicine are well-accepted in
medical circles.83 They are also now widely accessible through the National
Guideline Clearinghouse™ (NGC™), which is a public resource for evidence-

78. See supra text accompanying notes 54–75.
79. COMM. TO ADVISE THE PUB. HEALTH SERV. ON CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, INST.
OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM (Marilyn J. Field
& Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990).
80. Lucian L. Leape, Practice Guidelines and Standards: An Overview, 16 QUALITY REV.
BULL. 42, 43 (1990).
81. Id. See also Cynthia D. Mulrow & Kathleen N. Lohr, Proof and Policy from Medical
Research Evidence, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 249, 260 (2001).
82. Kinney, supra note 37, at 325.
83. See, e.g., Mulrow & Lohr, supra note 81, at 261; Carter L. Williams, Note, EvidenceBased Medicine in the Law Beyond Clinical Practice Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on
the Standard of Care?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 479 (2004).
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based clinical practice guidelines within the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (AHRQ) of the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS).84
When medical specialty societies began developing and publishing
medical practice guidelines on a widespread basis in the 1980s, scholars and
other reformers immediately recognized their potential for rationalizing the
standard of care in medical malpractice adjudication.85 Further, there have
been proposals to use these various standards of care to better manage the
establishment of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases.86 The state
of Maine established a demonstration to test the use of medical practice
guidelines only as an affirmative defense for physicians in malpractice cases.87
Notably, however, guidelines were not often used in this manner during course

84. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., NATIONAL GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.guideline.gov (last visited Oct. 4,
2004).
85. See generally Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts
Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 327 (2001); Michelle M.
Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645 (2001); E. Haavi Morreim, From the Clinics to the Courts:
The Role Evidence Should Play in Litigating Medical Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 409
(2001); Jodi M. Finder, The Future of Practice Guidelines: Should They Constitute Conclusive
Evidence of the Standard of Care?, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 67, 91 (2000); Daniel W. Shuman, The
Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Claims, Clinical Practice Guidelines, and Managed
Care: Towards a Therapeutic Harmony?, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 99 (1997); Megan L. Sheetz, Note,
Toward Controlled Clinical Care Through Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Legal Liability for
Developers and Issuers of Clinical Pathways, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1341 (1997); Lori Rinella,
Comment, The Use of Medical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation—Should
Practice Guidelines Define the Standard of Care?, 64 UMKC L. REV. 337 (1995); John D. Ayres,
The Use and Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 421 (1994); Troyen A.
Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Collision or Cohesion?, 16 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 67 (1991); Edward B. Hirshfeld, Practice Parameters and the Malpractice
Liability of Physicians, 263 JAMA 1556 (1990); Richard E. Leahy, Comment, Rational Health
Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice
Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1483 (1989); Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical
Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119 (1991); Eleanor D.
Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the Current Malpractice
Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (1989).
86. See Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: The
Role of Standard of Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877 (2002); Deborah W. Garnick et al., Can
Practice Guidelines Reduce the Number and Costs of Malpractice Claims?, 266 JAMA 2856
(1991); see also CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM (1995); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal
Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87 (1991); Clark C.
Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: The Policy Rationale, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
777 (1990).
87. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971–79 (West Supp. 1993–1994).
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of the demonstration.88 Some states have also permitted use of medical
practice guidelines as an affirmative defense in malpractice cases while others
permit both sides to introduce guidelines into evidence.89
As a practical matter, it appears the medical practice guidelines or other
medical standards of care have been used to prove the standard of care in
medical malpractice cases. However, they may not have lived up to their
potential. In addition to data on the Maine demonstration,90 a 1996 empirical
study of fifty-four cases that mentioned societies or agencies that issue practice
guidelines reported that only twenty-eight had used medical practice guidelines
in proving the standard of care.91 Perhaps this is because medical practice
guidelines are not specific enough to delineate all the circumstances that could
go wrong in the course of a medical procedure or the treatment of a disease or
injury.
One approach to improving the usefulness of medical practice guidelines
in the establishment of the standard of care is to develop standards that are
specifically targeted at setting the standard of care in malpractice cases. This
is not a new concept. In the past, theorists interested in establishing no-fault
compensation schemes for malpractice have identified circumstances in which
medical treatment falls below the standard of care and should be compensated
without further consideration fault.92 The most prominent theory of late is
accelerated compensation events, developed by Bovbjerg and Tancredi.93

88. Jennifer Begel, Maine Physician Practice Guidelines: Implications for Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 47 ME. L. REV. 69 (1995); Maine Doctors Test Lawsuit Preventive, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at A23; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. HRD-94-8, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: MAINE’S USE OF PRACTICE GUIDELINES TO REDUCE COSTS (1993), available at
http://161.203.16.4/t2pbat5/150172.pdf.
89. See, e.g., tit. 24, §§ 2971–79; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.65 (West 2000); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 408.02 (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-1602 (West 2000) (repealed
1999); see generally Gary W. Kuc, Comment, Practice Parameters as a Shield Against Physician
Liability, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 439 (1993); Andrew L. Hyams et al., Practice
Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: A Two Way Street, 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 450,
454 (1995).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 87–88.
91. Andrew L. Hyams et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation: An
Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 289, 295–296 (1996).
92. See COMM’N ON MED. PROF’L LIAB., AM. BAR ASS’N, DESIGNATED COMPENSABLE
EVENT SYSTEM: A FEASIBILITY STUDY 9–10 (1979).
93. See Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Rethinking Responsibility for Patient
Injury: Accelerated-Compensation Events, A Malpractice and Quality Reform Ripe for a Test, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1991); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Obstetrics and Malpractice:
Evidence on the Performance of a Selective No-Fault System, 265 JAMA 2836 (1991); Walter
Wadlington, Medical Injury Compensation: A Time for Testing New Approaches, 265 JAMA
2861 (1991); Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Advancing the Epidemiology of
Injury and Methods of Quality Control: ACEs as an Outcomes-Based System for Quality
Improvement, 18 QUALITY REV. BULL. 201 (1992).
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They propose an “avoidable event” approach to compensation reform,
developed independently by experts and contained in lists of events that are
deemed avoidable through better systems of care. These lists of compensable
events, which are really based on medical practice guidelines, have been
explored primarily in the development of no-fault reform.94 More recently, a
forum of stakeholders has established a list, in a consensus process, of events
that should “never” happen in the provision of care.95 All of these events
schemes could be developed further to apply to all malpractice adjudication.
The policy-making process should also be designed to identify all the
variables that would influence the application of the guideline so that
variations and responses thereto can be incorporated into the guideline. Such
variables would include the array of remedies for the medical condition in
question and the reasons for selecting specific remedies, important patient
variations, important geographic variables, and also different approaches based
on recognized differences in the medical training of schools of physicians, e.g.,
allopathy, homeopathy and osteopathy. It is important that the guidelines are
specific enough to address most common patient variations in their application.
For example, if there is a known complication among a subset of patients, the
complication should be addressed in the guideline, the patient variables that
precipitate the complication should be identified, and the recommended
approaches for addressing the complication should be specified. If the medical
practice guideline is too general and does not address known variations in its
application, then the application of the guideline to specific plaintiffs will
inevitably be decided by adjudicative facts that are particular to the patient
even though similar facts might well occur with many other similarly situated
patients.
Finally, it is critical that the process for developing such a medical
standard of care, whether the sponsor is a state, the federal government, or
another appropriate authority, be credible. To be credible, the process must be
transparent and must involve appropriate and well-respected expert advisors,
medical specialty societies, voluntary health organizations and other
individuals and organizations that the public recognizes have an appropriate
role in establishing medical standards.96 The policy-making process must also

94. David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries:
The Prospect for Error Prevention, 286 JAMA 217 (2001); David M. Studdert & Troyen A.
Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of “No-Fault” Compensation for Medical Injury in the
United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225 (2001); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 93; Tancredi &
Bovbjerg, supra note 93.
95. See NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, SERIOUS REPORTABLE EVENTS IN HEALTHCARE: A
CONSENSUS REPORT (2002).
96. Eleanor D. Kinney, Behind the Veil Where the Action Is: Private Policy Making and
American Health Care, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 145, 193 (1999); see also KINNEY, supra note 20, at
109–126.
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garner all available empirical research, as it is critical that it reflects the latest
clinical and health services research rather than simply the opinions of specific
physicians, however notable. In addition, the process should also reflect the
concept of “appropriateness” of services in that the potential health benefits of
the service exceed the potential harms or risks by a margin.97
3.

Using Legislative Facts to Establish Damages and Compensation

Administrative agencies have become quite systematic in their
measurement of damages. Most public compensation programs administered
by agencies, such as the Social Security Disability Insurance program, 98
Department of Labor Workers’ Compensation programs,99 and Veterans
Disability programs,100 award benefits pursuant to predetermined schedules
based on specific types and degrees of injury or illness. These schedules
permit the award of compensation through consultation with the relevant
schedules and without litigation in most cases.
Several scholars have suggested scheduling damages in medical
malpractice cases as a means of bringing rationality and consistency to injury
compensation in medical malpractice.101 While it is beyond the scope of this
97. See Mulrow and Lohr, supra note 81, at 259.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434 (2000).
99. See, e.g., Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-324, 110
Stat. 3933 (1996) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2000)); Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2654 (2000)) (providing compensation for many federal workers, including postal workers, peace
corps workers and volunteers, and civil officers or employees in any branch of government);
Federal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969) (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–945 (2000)) (providing compensation for victims of Black Lung
Disease); National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to 300aa-23 (2000)); Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-398, 114 Stat. 1654
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7384–7385o (2000)); Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§651–78 (2000));
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-245, 114 Stat. 501
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2000)); DIV. OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR
WORKERS’ COMP. (DLHWC), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PROCEDURE MANUAL ch. 3-301, § 8,
available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/owcp/dlhwc/lspm/lspm3-301.htm (calculation procedure for
compensating loss of wage-earning capacity); The Workers’ Comp Service Center, at
http://www.workerscompensation.com/minnesota/htdocs/index.php3?SCREEN=department&sid
=&department=3104 (providing detailed fee schedules for Minnesota and information about other
states’ workers’ compensation programs).
100. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5301, 5307 (2000).
101. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for
Assessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1991); Randall R. Bovbjerg et
al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908
(1989); Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 243 (1997); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments about Liability and
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article to analyze these proposed schemes in great detail, it is important to
emphasize that they address the exact same issues as statutory compensation
schemes—the nature, severity, and permanency of the injury. The level of
compensation for injuries of a specific nature, severity, and permanency are all
issues that can be independently determined without reference to specific
individuals. As such, they are legislative facts.
As legislative facts, states or even the federal government could establish
the nature, severity and permanency of medical injuries as well as associated
compensation levels in a policy-making process. Already, the Severity of
Injury Scale developed by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, which ranges from one (emotional injury only) to nine
(death), is widely used as a measure of the severity and duration of disability in
the insurance industry.102
How these facts are determined is important because process is the major
force that accords credibility to the determination of legislative facts.
Sponsoring authorities, such as states, should constitute expert panels
composed of representatives from interested parties, including former
malpractice litigants, to develop schedules of injury compensation for purposes
of compensating malpractice claims. Appropriate interests represented include
physicians, insurers, disability and long-term care professionals, and financial
experts. To assure transparency and credibility, the meetings of the panel
should be regular, public, and offer an opportunity for other interested parties
to present views and information to the panel. The reports of the panel should
also be available to the public, who will have an opportunity to comment on
drafts that will be incorporated into final products. This type of process is very
typical of administrative policy-making processes.
It is also important that compensation schedules be empirically grounded.
Such a condition presumes that the schedule will be based on empirical
research of what existing statutory compensation schemes pay and the
experience of claimants with respect to needs met and other benefits under
these schemes. The empirical research should also address the levels of
compensation under existing accident and disability compensation schemes to
gain political support for the adoption of compensation schedules for
malpractice. Finally, should compensation schedules be implemented, it is
critical that they be evaluated empirically. Administrative agencies have great
experience in the design and implementation of empirical studies for the
evaluation of government programs, including demonstrations of innovative
approaches to public problems.

Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301,
320–322 (1998).
102. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: FINAL COMPILATION 304–06
(M. Patricia Sowka ed., 1980).
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The remaining argument against using damage schedules is that they do
not allow the unique characteristics of specific individuals to justify variation
from the common schedules. Such differences could easily be accommodated
in much the same way as the concept of special damages in tort law addresses
such exigencies. Specifically, special damages would be available when the
plaintiff sustains a special type of damage unique to him or her.103 The
definition of the circumstances or the rules for determining eligibility for
special damages would clearly have to be quite tight to resist pressures to
obtain special damages in unwarranted circumstances where the claimant did
not incur truly unique damage.
B.

Risk Analysis in the Regulation of Risks to Health and Safety and its
Application to Malpractice

Modern regulation targeted to reduce or eliminate risks to human health
and safety began with public health regulation in the nineteenth century. It
accelerated after World War II and the concurrent period of great confidence in
the contributions of technology to human well-being. Specifically, in the
1960s concerns emerged as to the degree to which various technology-based
activities posed risks to human health and safety. The emergence of the
environmental movement is exemplary of this development. By the end of the
1960s, a sea change occurred in the public attitudes toward technology from
relatively unquestioned acceptance of technology to concerns about its risks to
human health and safety.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. Congress enacted a host of new
statutes establishing new regulatory programs to reduce the risks to human
health and safety in the environment, the workplace and other settings.104 In
response to this substantial increase in federal regulation of health and safety
risks, the business community and political conservatives sought to roll back
the scope of these new regulatory programs.
Immediately after his
inauguration, Republican President Ronald Regan adopted Executive Order
12,291, with Executive Order 12,498, following.105 These executive orders
required cost-benefit analysis for major rules promulgated by federal
administrative agencies as well as a regulatory impact analysis for major rules.
The debate over risk analysis, which was so divisive during the 1980s, has
largely been resolved in the U.S. The federal government sponsored many
high-level studies of risk analysis by expert panels during this period to clarify

103. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 3.3(4), at 226–
29 (2d ed. 1993).
104. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
105. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981); Exec. Order No.
12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 8, 1985).
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the role of risk analysis in federal regulation.106 Now there is wide acceptance
of the concept that risk-benefit analysis is an appropriate component of
regulation. All presidents after Reagan, including Democratic President Bill
Clinton, issued executive orders requiring cost-benefit analysis in major
rulemaking proceedings.
In conjunction with these developments, various types of risk-benefit
analysis have evolved to address different conceptions of proper approaches to
such analysis. In addition, scholars and policy-makers in administrative law
and policy science have paid considerable attention to improvement of the
regulation of risks to health and safety. Scholars have analyzed whether risks
are defined and measured correctly. 107 In more recent years, scholarship has
critiqued the assumptions and associated techniques used in regulatory risk
analysis to determine if a particular regulatory intervention is appropriate.108
1.

Methods of Risk Analysis

Risk analysis is the balancing of the risks of an enterprise and the benefits
to be obtained from the enterprise.109 Over the years, epidemiologists,
toxicologists, and other physical and social scientists have developed methods

106. See, e.g., COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT (1994); CARNEGIE
COMM’N ON SCIENCE, TECH., & GOV’T, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING
REGULATORY DECISION MAKING (1993); COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR
ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983).
107. See, e.g., COMM. ON RISK CHARACTERIZATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (Paul C. Stern &
Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993); IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); THOMAS O. MCGARITY,
REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACY (1991); EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982); MICHAEL S. BARAM ET AL.,
ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION: MANAGING RISKS TO HEALTH, SAFETY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1982); see also Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost
Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221 (1996); John S.
Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic
Substances Control, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1991); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad
Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988).
108. See, e.g., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE
(2002); JULIAN MORRIS, RETHINKING RISK AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2000); RISK
VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham &
Jonathan Baert Weiner, eds., 1995).
109. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH, & TECH.,
98TH CONG., A REVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES 63–68 (Comm. Print 1983).
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for analyzing risk.110 It involves an assessment of the nature of a risk, the
population exposed to the risk, and the selection of one or more common
measures of the risk, such as deaths, injuries, or variations thereof. Also, an
extensive body of mathematical and epidemiological techniques has been
developed to estimate and calculate risk as well as its magnitude and
probability.111 In addition, methods have been developed to address the
phenomena of uncertainty and variability—factors which are an inherent part
of risk.112
A major concern of scholars and other observers is that inaccurate public
perception of risk dominates risk-benefit analysis resulting in questionable
regulatory policy.113 In the last twenty-five years, there has also been an
extraordinary body of empirical research on risk perception that suggests
public perceptions of particular risks and their comparative importance are
This research indicates that the most important
quite inaccurate.114
determinants of public perception of risk are qualitative factors grounded in
cultural and psychological factors. For example, qualitative variables such the
voluntariness or familiarity of the risk will shape public perception of risk and,
specifically, minimize risk in public perceptions in ways that are not warranted
by empirical evidence of risk. This research confirms the observation that the
concept of risk itself is a sociological construct.115 The upshot has been the
development of analytical approaches to the assessment of risk that endeavor
to quantify the probability of risk of injury from specific activities.
2.

Use of Risk Analysis in Determining Foreseeability and Causation in
Malpractice Adjudication

The real potential contribution of regulatory risk analysis to tort is its
methods for marshaling scientific and empirically tested information and
methodologies to ascertain the nature of a particular risk and its harm, as well
as the probability the risk of injury will occur and to what magnitude. These
methods of risk analysis assess risk in a more systematic fashion than does tort
law, as discussed above,116 and remains a controversial issue among tort
scholars, policy-makers and practitioners. Specifically, the elements of duty

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See RICHARD WILSON & EDMUND A. C. CROUCH, RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2001).
Id. at 25–80.
Id. at 80–97.
See, e.g., id.; SUNSTEIN, supra note 51; BREYER, supra note 107.
See, e.g., RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA: UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES TO
MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (James Flynn et al. eds., 2001); PAUL SLOVIC, THE
PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000); Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280 (1987).
115. See, e.g., RISK AND SOCIOCULTURAL THEORY: NEW DIRECTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
(Deborah Lupton ed., 1999); SHELDON KRIMSKY AND DOMINIC GOLDING, SOCIAL THEORIES OF
RISK (1992).
116. See supra notes 44–53, 98–103 and accompanying text.
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and causation both call for a determination of the foreseeability of the
probability and magnitude of the risk, and, as discussed above, foreseeability
has proven to be both a theoretical and empirical problem in the resolution of
negligence cases.117
Furthermore, under administrative law theory, many of the issues
associated with the foreseeability and particularity of the risk of injury are
legislative facts that can be determined independently of the circumstances of
the parties.118 From this perspective, it is unnecessary to inquire whether there
was a duty to foresee a risk as a matter of law in negligence cases because the
risk was so remote and improbable. This kind of determination in
administrative law would be a legislative fact and would be highly dependent
on scientific notions of causation and probability.119 To the extent that
foreseeability of the risk of injury is a matter of breach of the standard of care
or causation, much of the determination can be based on such legislative facts
developed in epidemiological studies.120 As such, these approaches are
consistent with the evidence-based medicine movement that informs the
development of medical practice guidelines and other medical standards of
care.121
The most important potential contribution that modern regulatory risk
analysis can make is the identification of the qualitative and often irrational
factors that inform public perceptions of risk. This latter effort, grounded on
important empirical research on the fundamental irrationality of public
perceptions of risks,122 demonstrates that such public perceptions may well
influence juries and even judges in their decision making in negligence cases.
Just as regulators have to respond to public perception of a particular risk,
adjudicators of medical malpractice claims must recognize the issues
associated with public perceptions of risk and take steps to ensure that decision
makers, i.e., jury members, have accurate information about the probabilities
and characteristics of the risk at issue. At the very least, courts should
recognize that empirical evidence on public perception of risk are also
essentially legislative facts that can be established through expert testimony at
trial or other sources of legislative facts such as empirical research. Such
information could do much to guide decision makers, including juries, in
making more accurate assessments of relevant risks.
In assessing the risk of injury in medical malpractice cases, decision
makers in malpractice adjudication should insist on more rigor in the analysis

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 54–103.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 79–97.
See supra text accompanying notes 36–40.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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of the risk of injury to the victim. They should appreciate that much of the
issue of foreseeability of risk involves legislative facts that are not particular to
the individual. To the extent that relevant government-sponsored studies of
particular risks are available, they should be available and introduced into
evidence to clarify the risk analysis in the tort lawsuit.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article does not suggest that the resolution of medical malpractice
claims should be moved to a state agency, such as a state health department, or
a federal agency, such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Regarding transfer to a federal agency, tort law has traditionally been located
within the province of state law. Sovereign states have managed tort law with
little interference from the federal courts, except in the case of diversity
jurisdiction where the federal courts have deferred to prevailing state law.123
Likewise, Congress has been reluctant to interfere directly in state tort law.
Only when it has perceived that there are threats to the health and safety of the
population has Congress intervened and established a regulatory program.124
Also, Congress has been willing to establish statutory injury compensation
schemes for groups of workers with specific injuries as well as groups of
workers with specific conditions such as brown lung disease and workers, such
as longshoremen, working in nationwide industries.125
This article assumes that, in all likelihood, the adjudication and
compensation of medical malpractice claims will remain in state courts under
state law. Indeed, there are many reasons it is desirable to leave the
adjudication of malpractice claims with state trial judges. First, these judges
are established and have experience in the adjudication of medical issues and
tort law. Second, the depth and sophistication of administrative law judges
across states is inconsistent. Some states have central panels of well-paid and
knowledgeable administrative law judges, while others use administrative law
judges on a less systematic basis and often hire outside lawyers or use internal

123. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Joan E. Schaffner, Federal
Circuit “Choice of Law”: Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173 (1996);
William A. Braverman, Note, Janus Was Not a god of Justice: Realignment of Parties in
Diversity Jurisdiction, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072 (1993).
124. See generally Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State
Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1997); Perry H. Apelbaum & Samara T. Ryder, The Third
Wave of Federal Tort Reform: Protecting the Public or Pushing the Constitutional Envelope?, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591 (1999); Valerie Watnick, Federal Preemption of Tort Claims
Under FIFRA: The Erosion of a Defense, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 419 (2003); M. Stuart
Madden, Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State Safety Obligations, 21 PACE L. REV. 103
(2000); Michael A. Walker, Note, CERCLA’s Natural Resource Damage Provisions: A Loophole
for Private Landowners?, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 425 (1995).
125. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
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staff to adjudicate disputes.126 Given the realities of state budgets, 127 it is
unlikely that states would be willing to add major responsibilities to a central
panel of ALJs or to develop the requisite ALJ corps to adjudicate malpractice
claims.
However, it is not necessary to lodge adjudication of malpractice claims in
an administrative agency to take advantage of fact-finding and analysis
techniques used by administrative agencies of the type described above. These
administrative law approaches can be enacted by statute or court rule and used
in the resolution of conventional state tort causes of action. Whatever the
venue, administrative law, in particular its concept of legislative facts and
techniques of risk analysis, can contribute much to the expeditious and just
adjudication and compensation of medical malpractice claims in the United
States.

126. See Allen C. Hoberg, Ten Years Later: The Progress of State Central Panels, 21 J.
NAT’L. ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 235 (2001); Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State
Central Panels in the 1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 75 (1994), reprinted in 14 J. NAT’L. ASS’N.
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 107 (1994); see also Phyllis E. Bernard, The Administrative Law Judge as a
Bridge between Law and Culture, 23 J. NAT’L. ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1 (2003).
127. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES: JUNE 2001, (2001),
available at http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/PDFs/FSJUN2001.pdf; NAT’L GOVERNORS
ASS’N, STATES FACE UNPRECEDENTED BUDGET SHORTFALLS, (Dec. 10, 2001), available at
http://www.nga.org/nga/newsRoom/1,1169,C_PRESS_RELEASE^D_2945,00.html; MARK M.
ZANDI, THE OUTLOOK FOR STATE TAX REVENUES (2001), available at http://www.nga.org/cda/
files/TaxRevenues.pdf; NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, STATES’ BUDGET FORECAST CLOUDY, (Dec.
18, 2000), available at http://www.nga.org/nga/newsRoom/1,1169,C_PRESS_RELEASE^D_
624,00.html.

